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Abstract
This paper studies in a multiple-winner contest setting how the total eﬀorts may vary
between a grand contest and a set of subcontests. We first show that the rent-dissipation rate
increases when the numbers of contestants and prizes are “scaled up”. In other words, the total
eﬀorts of a contest exhibit a striking “increasing return to scale” property: when the numbers
of contestants and prizes scale up proportionally, the total eﬀorts of the contest increase more
than proportionally. Thus, the total eﬀorts must increase when a set of identical subcontests
are merged into a grand contest. Equivalently, the total eﬀorts decrease when a grand contest
is evenly divided. We further allow the grand contest to be split into uneven subcontests. We
show that under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), the grand contest
generates more eﬀorts as compared to any split contests.
JEL Nos: C72, D72
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1 Introduction
Contest is the situation where economic agents expend costly and non-refundable eﬀorts in
order to win a limited number of prizes. Abundant examples of such competition can be
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observed in everyday life, such as promotion tournaments in internal labor markets inside
firms, political campaigns, influence politics, college admissions, etc. Due to their ubiquity,
contests have naturally attracted enormous attention from economic scholars, and a huge
body of literature has been developed to explore the strategic behaviors of rent seekers in
a wide variety of contexts. It has been widely recognized that the rule or the organization
of a contest may pivotally influence contestants’ incentives and behaviors. As argued by
Gradstein and Konrad (1999), “. . . the contest structures are the outcome of a careful design
with the view of attaining a variety of objectives, one of which is maximization of eﬀorts by
contenders”. A great number of papers therefore have been devoted to the optimal design
of contests that contribute to the interests of contest organizers.
Though a lion’s share of these papers assume that contestants compete against all others
for a single prize (winner-take-all), the assumption contrasts with many contest settings in
reality. For instance, the government telecommunication regulator may issue a few oper-
ating licenses. Universities pick out thousands of freshmen from hundreds of thousands of
applicants every year. A number of seats in parliament can be available to nevertheless a
greater number of statesmen up for election. In all these examples, more than one prize is
awarded, while each contestant may receive no more than one of them. While the design of
“winner-take-all” contests has been thoroughly investigated in the literature, only a handful
of papers concern themselves with the optimal structure of multi-winner contests1.
In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of multi-winner imperfectly-discriminatory
contest design: the “size” of the contest. A contest organizer is planning to distribute a fixed
number of prizes to a fixed pool of contestants. We attempt to investigate how the total
eﬀorts may vary between a grand contest and a set of subcontests. More specifically, the
purpose of this paper is to study how the total eﬀorts induced from rent-seeking contestants
may vary when a set of subcontests are merged into a grand contest, or equivalently, when
the grand multi-winner contest splits into “smaller” subcontests.
To pick out the prize recipients, the contest can be organized in two ways: the “grand”
1Imperctly-discriminatory contest models that involve multiple-winner settings can be seen in the studies
by Clark and Riis (1996, 1998a, 1998b), Amegashie, and Yates and Heckelman (2001). Barut and Kovenock
(1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2006), and Moldovanu, Sela, and Shi (2006) investigate multiple-prize compe-
tition in perfectly-discriminatory conest setting (all-pay auction).
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contest and the “split” contest. The contest organizer may administer a “grand” contest, in
which every contestant competes against all others for all the prizes available. The swimming
competitions in Olympic Games and World Championships tournaments exemplify such a
grand contest. Swimmers are initially placed in diﬀerent heats, and the eight fastest advance
to the finals. The qualification to finals is not determined by a swimmer’s rank within his/her
own heat, but his/her relative performance compared to all other opponents, including those
who are placed in other heats. By the way of contrast, the contest organizer may split the
grand contest into a set of subcontests, in each of which a subset of contestants compete
against each other for a subset of the prizes. The “split” or “divisionalized” contest is not
unusual either. For instance, in the recent past, the state government of Texas (as well as
California and Florida) administered the “Percentage Plan” in college admissions. Under
this policy, ten percent of top students in each high school are automatically admitted into
The University of Texas system (or the counterparts in California and Florida), no matter
how their academic performance is compared to students in other schools. As a result,
the previously statewide races for admissions are more or less “downsized” to intra-school
competitions.
How does the “grand” swimming competition rule diﬀer from its “split” counterpart in
providing incentives to the swimmers? Does the shift of admissions policy aﬀect high school
students’ incentive to engage in academic eﬀorts? In general, which organizing institution
demands more eﬀorts from contestants, the “grand”, or the “split”? Does the “grand”
dominate any set of “split” contests? Or does the comparison depend upon how the grand
contest is divided? In particular, consider two seemingly equivalent contests with one hun-
dred contestants and ten prizes: the first one consists of ten identical subcontests, each of
which awards a single prize to ten potential recipients; while the other is a grand pooling
competition that awards ten prizes to a hundred. Are they indeed identical? If they are not,
which contest demands more eﬀort from contestants?
To address these questions, we consider a grand contest C, in which K > 1 prizes are
available to N > K contestants. We allow the grand contest to be split into a set of M > 1
subcontests Ci. In each of them, Ni persons compete for Ki prizes, with Ni ≥ Ki ≥ 1,
MX
i=1
Ni = N , and
MX
i=1
Ki = K. Our main findings are summarized as follows.
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1. The output (total eﬀorts) of contests exhibits a striking “increasing-return-to-
scale” property: When the numbers of contestants and prizes scale up proportionally,
the total eﬀorts of the contest increase more than proportionally. Therefore the rent-
dissipation rate increases. Consequently, our result implies that the total eﬀorts of a
contest decrease when the grand contest is evenly split into a set of identical partitions.
In other words, the total eﬀorts increase when a set of identical subcontests merge into
a grand contest.
2. We further allow the grand contest to be unevenly divided. We establish a mild suﬃ-
cient condition (regular contest technology defined in Section 3.2), under which given
the total number of contestants and the total number of prizes, the grand contest
dominates any split contests in terms of the total eﬀorts induced.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and present
the general equilibrium solutions. The research questions are analyzed in details in Section
3. Section 4 discusses the implications and applications of our results, and concludes this
paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Multi-Winner Contests
Denote byC ≡ C(N,K, V ) a contest withN ≥ 2 identical risk-neutral contestants competing
for K ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} prizes of the unit value V . The N contestants simultaneously choose
their eﬀort outlays to compete for the K prizes. In the case where K = 1, a single winner
receives the prize. We consider a contest success function, which is axiomized by Skaperdas
(1996). A contestant i wins the prize with the probability
Pi =
f(ei)
NP
j=1
f(ej)
, (1)
given the contestants’ eﬀorts profile e = (e1, e2, . . . , eN). Wärneryd (2001) names f the im-
pact function, which indicates contestants’ technology. To guarantee an interior equilibrium,
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we assume the function f is strictly increasing, twice diﬀerentiable, and weakly concave.
Thus, a contestant i chooses his/her eﬀort ei to maximize the expected payoﬀ
πi = PiV − ei. (2)
In the case where K > 1, we then consider a multi-winner nested contest as studied
by Clark and Riis (1996, 1998), as well as Fu and Lu (2006), but assume a general impact
function f(e) as defined above. A block of K prizes are awarded in a sequential lottery
process. Contestants simultaneously submit their eﬀorts, while the winners of the contest
are sequentially selected in K consecutive draws. Each contestant is allowed to receive no
more than one prize. Thus, once a contestant is selected to win a prize, he/she is immediately
removed from the pool of candidates up for the next draw. Denote by Ωm the set of remaining
contestants for the m−th draw, with m ≤ K. The conditional probability that a contestant
i ∈ Ωm wins the m−th prize is given by
p(ei, e−i;ΩM) =
f(ei)P
j∈ΩM
f(ej)
. (3)
Denote by Pm(ei, e−i) the probability that contestant i is selected in the m−th draw.
Note that Pm(ei, e−i) =
X
∀Ωml
[Pr(Ωml ) Pr(i ∈ Ωml )p(ei, e−i;Ωml )], where Pr(Ωml ) is the prob-
ability that the remaining contestants up for the m-th draw are Ωml , and Pr(i ∈ Ωml ) is
the probability that contestant i belongs to Ωml . A contestant i chooses his/her eﬀort ei to
maximize
πi = V
KP
m=1
Pm(ei, e−i)− ei. (4)
2.2 Equilibrium Solutions
Denote by e the equilibrium eﬀort each contestant exerts in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
of the contest (N,K, V ), and denote by E ≡ Ne the total eﬀorts the N contestants make in
the contest. With a symmetric Nash equilibrium eﬀort e, we have
∂Pm(e, ..., e)
∂ei
=
(1−
m−1P
t=0
1
N−t)
N
f 0(e)
f(e)
. (5)
Note that
KX
m=1
(1−
m−1P
t=0
1
N − t) = K −
K−1P
g=0
K − g
N − g . (6)
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Define H(e) ≡ f(e)
f 0(e) . Because f(e) is increasing and concave, we have H
0(e) > 0. Inserting
(6) into (5), we establish the first order condition for the symmetric Nash equilibrium
H(e)− 1
N
(K −
K−1P
g=0
K − g
N − g )V = 0. (7)
Proposition 1 In the symmetric Nash equilibrium of aN−person, K-prize contest (N,K, V ),
each contestant makes an eﬀort
e = H−1[
1
N
(K −
K−1P
g=0
K − g
N − g )V ]. (8)
The total eﬀorts the N contestants make in the contest is then given by
E = NH−1[
1
N
(K −
K−1P
g=0
K − g
N − g )V ]. (9)
3 Analysis
In this paper, we consider a situation where the contest organizer plans to give away a
total of K prizes of unit value V to K recipients from a pool of a total of N contestants,
with N > K > 1. We define C = C(N,K, V ) the grand contest, where the N contestants
compete for the K prizes. The grand contest C can be split into M ≥ 2 subcontests
Ci = C(Ni,Ki, V ), where N =
MX
i=1
Ni and K =
MX
i=1
Ki. In a subcontest Ci, Ni contestants
compete for Ki ∈ {1, ..., Ni} prizes of the unit value V . Thus, in other words, the grand
contest C is the combination of the M subcontests Ci.
We denote by Ei the total equilibrium eﬀorts the Ni contestants make in each subcontest
Ci, with i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and denote by E the total eﬀorts the total of N contestants make
in the combined contest C. By Proposition 1, we obtain
Ei = NiH−1[
1
Ni
(Ki −
Ki−1P
gi=0
Ki − gi
Ni − gi
)V ], (10)
and
E = NH−1[
1
N
(K −
K−1P
h=0
K − h
N − h)V ]. (11)
Without a merger, theN contestants make the eﬀort
MX
i=1
Ei =
MX
i=1
{NiH−1[ 1Ni (Ki−
Ki−1P
gi=0
Ki−gi
Ni−gi )V ]}
in the set of M smaller contests Ci.
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The intent of this paper is to compare the total eﬀorts of the grand contest to that of
the set of split subcontests. Consider the equilibrium eﬀort solution we have obtained. The
comparison between
MX
i=1
Ei =
MX
i=1
{NiH−1[ 1Ni (Ki −
Ki−1P
gi=0
Ki−gi
Ni−gi )V ]} and E = NH−1[ 1N (K −
K−1P
g=0
K−g
N−g )V ] would be inconclusive, since virtually no restriction has been imposed on the
form of the impact function f(e).
3.1 The “Replication” of Contests
For this moment, we consider a simple but interesting case, which requires the subcontests
Ci(Ni, Ki, V ) to be identical, with Ni = Nj = eN and Ki = Kj = eK,∀i, j ∈ {1, ...,M}.
As a result, the grand contest C(N,K, V ) is therefore a “M-fold replication”2 of each
single subcontest, with N = M eN , and K = M eK. When the set of subcontests are merged
into the grand one, the ratio of the number of prizes to the number of contestants hold
constant. In the symmetric equilibrium of either setting, a contestant has a chance of KN to
receive a prize. Does the behavior of the contestants diﬀer between a grand contest and a
subcontest?
By equation (10), we have
Ei = eNH−1[( eKeN − 1eN
?K−1P
g=0
eK − geN − g )V ], and (12)
MX
i=1
Ei = M eNH−1[( eKeN − 1eN
?K−1P
g=0
eK − geN − g )V ]. (13)
In the grand contest that is a “M-fold replication” of each single subcontest, the equilib-
rium total eﬀort E can be rewritten as
E = M eNH−1[ 1
M eN (M eK − M
?K−1P
h=0
M eK − h
M eN − h)V ]
= M eNH−1[( eKeN − 1M eN M
?K−1P
h=0
M eK − h
M eN − h)V ]. (14)
2Wärneryd (2001) defines a contest with rN contestants competing for a prize of the value rV as the
r−fold replication of the contest with N contestants competing for a prize of the value V . In our context,
which may involve more than one winner, we borrow the terminology “r−fold replication” of the original
contest, but it represents a diﬀerent setting from Wärneryd (2001). We allow the number of prizes and the
number of contestants vary, but keep constant the value of each single prize.
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Proposition 2 When a grand contest is split into a set of identical subcontests, with the
same number of contestants competing for the same number of prizes in each of them, the
total eﬀorts induced decrease, i.e., E >
MX
i=1
Ei.
Proof. To show this result, we only need to compare (13) to (14) and show that E >
MX
i=1
Ei,
for M > 1. We rewrite
M ?K−1P
h=0
M ?K−h
M ?N−h as
M ?K−1P
h=0
M eK − h
M eN − h = M−1Ph=0 M eK − hM eN − h + 2M−1Ph=M M eK − hM eN − h + · · ·+
?KM−1P
h=( ?K−1)M
M eK − h
M eN − h
=
?KX
i=1
iM−1X
hi=(i−1)M
M eK − hi
M eN − hi . (15)
Because
M eK − hi
M eN − hi = M
eK − (i− 1)M
M eN − (i− 1)M
=
eK − (i− 1)eN − (i− 1) , (16)
and M
?K−hi
M ?N−hi
is decreasing in hi, we have
iM−1X
hi=(i−1)M
M eK − hi
M eN − hi < M
eK − (i− 1)eN − (i− 1) . (17)
Inequality (17) implies
?KX
i=1
iM−1X
hi=(i−1)M
M eK − hi
M eN − hi < M
?KX
i=1
eK − (i− 1)eN − (i− 1)
= M
?K−1X
i=0
eK − ieN − i
= M
?K−1P
g=0
eK − geN − g . (18)
Hence, eKeN − 1M eN M
?K−1P
h=0
M eK − h
M eN − h = eKeN − 1eN [ 1M M
?K−1P
h=0
M eK − h
M eN − h ]
>
eKeN − 1eN
?K−1P
g=0
eK − geN − g . (19)
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As H−1(·) is an increasing function, we have
E >
MX
i=1
Ei. (20)
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 contends that the grand contest induces more eﬀorts as compared to the
set of identical subcontests. This result requires only the weak concavity on f , therefore it
holds under fairly general settings. Because all contestants are identical, it reveals that in
the symmetric equilibrium, a contestant behaves more competitively in the grand contest,
although in the equilibrium he/she has the same chance to receive a prize in either contest
setting. Our analysis therefore sheds light on a more fundamental question: How does the
structure of a multiple-winner contest aﬀect contestants’ incentives to make eﬀorts? We
argue that the equilibrium eﬀort of a contest exhibits the following “increasing-return-
to-scale” property.
Theorem 1 In a multiple-winner contest, holding constant the unit prize value, when the
number of contestants and the number of prizes increase by a common integer factor t,
(i) each contestant increases his/her equilibrium eﬀort;
(ii) the total eﬀorts end up with increasing by more than t times.
The equilibrium rent-dissipation rate for a contest is defined as the ratio of total eﬀort
and total prizes, i.e. NeKV . The following implication naturally arises.
Corollary 1 When the number of contestants and the number of prizes increase proportion-
ally, the rent-dissipation rate strictly increases.
We contend that a “bigger” contest would demand more eﬀorts than contestants even if
the number of prizes increase in proportion to the number of contestants. Theorem 1 yields
important insights for economic studies on contests. It implies that contestants behave
diﬀerently when the “scale” of the contest varies. Thus, insights obtained from relatively
small contest settings may not naturally extend to contests of large scale.
To understand the intuition behind the result, consider two identical smaller contests, C1
and C2. Suppose in each of them, N identical risk-neutral contestants compete for K < N
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prizes of the unit value V , while in the merged contest 2N identical risk-neutral contestants
compete for 2K < 2N prizes of the unit value V . In contests C1 and C2, the eﬀorts exerted
by the contestants increase their winning probabilities for the first K draws. By the way of
contrast, in the merged contest, the eﬀorts exerted by the contestants increase their winning
probabilities for the first 2K draws, which yields higher marginal return as compared to the
smaller contest. The increased marginal return to eﬀort therefore leads to higher equilibrium
eﬀorts as the marginal costs of eﬀort remain unchanged. It should be clarified that the higher
individual eﬀort in the “scaled-up” contest does not stem from the escalated competition
among a larger number of contestants. This is clear from the equilibrium eﬀort solution as
given by equation (8): When f(e) = e and K = 1 in (8), we have e = 1N (1 −
1
N ), which
decreases with N for N ≥ 2.
3.2 Uneven Subcontests
Our previous results show that the total eﬀorts decrease when a grand contest is evenly
split into a set of identical subcontests. In this part, we extend our analysis to the setting
where the grand contest can be unevenly divided. Consider a simple example with a grand
contest C = C(10, 4, 1) and a linear impact function f(e) = e. The grand contest C can
be split into two subcontests C1 = C(7, 3, 1) and C2 = C(3, 1, 1) . From Proposition 1,
we have e = 0.287, e1 = 0.291 and e2 = 0.222. Once the grand contest is split into C1
and C2 in the above way, contestants allocated to C1 increase eﬀort, while contestant in
C2 reduce eﬀorts. But nevertheless, when it comes to the total eﬀorts induced, we see that
2X
i=1
Ei = 2.704 < E = 2.87, and the grand contest C dominates the set of two split contests.
However, a contest can be structured and split in numerous ways. Thus, an interesting
question arises: is the dominance of the grand contest we observed from this example merely
an artifact of the particular setting, or does it stem from any regularity that applies in
broader contexts? Alternatively, if such regularity exists, then to what extent does it hold?
To this purpose, we consider the class of contests that satisfy the following regularity
condition.
Definition 1 A contest is regular if and only if
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(i) contestants’ impact function f(e) is strictly increasing, concave and third-order dif-
ferentiable;
(ii) H−1(·) is concave, where H(·) = f(·)
f 0(·) .
3
To compare
MX
i=1
Ei with E, we first present the following key Lemma, which summarizes
an interesting property of the series {K−gN−g}K−1g=0 .
Lemma 1
K1−1X
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1X
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 >
K1+K2−1X
g=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g , ∀N1 ≥ K1 > 0, N2 ≥ K2 > 0, with
N1 +N2 > K1 +K2.
Please refer to the appendix for the proof of Lemma 1. The main idea of the proof
is quite straightforward. Define S to be the set composed of all the K1 + K2 elements in
series {K1+K2−gN1+N2−g }K1+K2−1g=0 , and eS to be the set composed of all the K1 + K2 elements in
the combined series of {K1−g1N1−g1 }K1−1g1=0 ∪ {
K2−g2
N2−g2 }K2−1g2=0 . In the proof, we constructively set up a
one-to-one correspondence between S and eS, such that any element in S is smaller than or
equal to its counterpart in eS.
With the property revealed by Lemma 1, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 The grand contest induces more total eﬀorts than the set of subcontests, i.e.
E >
MX
i=1
Ei, ∀M ≥ 2.
Proof. We first consider two subcontests C1 and C2, which belong to the set of M contests.
Without loss of generality, we assume K1 + K2 < N1 + N2. We denote by C1∪2 = (N1 +
N2, K1+K2, V ) the contest that combinesC1 andC2. By Proposition 1, without combination,
the total eﬀorts induced by the two subcontests are given by
E1 +E2 = N1H−1[
1
N1
(K1 −
K1−1P
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
)V ] +N2H−1[
1
N2
(K2 −
K2−1P
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
)V ]. (21)
In contrast, in the combined contest, the total eﬀorts contestants make amount to
E1∪2 = (N1 +N2)H−1[
1
N1 +N2
(K1 +K2 −
K1+K2−1P
h=0
K1 +K2 − h
N1 +N2 − h
)V ]. (22)
3This property is not necessary for the results in section 3.1.
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Step 1: E1 +E2 ≤ (N1 +N2)H−1{[(K1 +K2)− (
K1−1P
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1P
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 )]V }.
Because H(e) = f(e)
f 0(e) is concave, it follows that H
−1(·) is convex in its argument. By
Jensen’s inequality, we establish
E1 +E2
= N1H−1[
1
N1
(K1 −
K1−1P
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
)V ] +N2H−1[
1
N2
(K2 −
K2−1P
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
)V ]
≤ (N1 +N2)H−1{ N1N1 +N2 · [
1
N1
(K1 −
K1−1P
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
)V ] +
N2
N1 +N2
· [ 1
N2
(K2 −
K2−1P
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
)V ]}
= (N1 +N2)H−1{ 1N1 +N2 [(K1 +K2)− (
K1−1P
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
+
K2−1P
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
)]V }. (23)
Step 2: (K1 +K2)− (
K1−1P
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1P
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 ) < (K1 +K2)−
K1+K2−1X
g=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g .
This inequality directly follows from Lemma 1.
Step 3: E1 +E2 < E1∪2.
Because H−1(·) is strictly increasing, we have
H−1{[(K1 +K2)− (
K1−1P
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
+
K2−1P
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
)]V }
< H−1{[(K1 +K2)−
K1+K2−1X
g=0
K1 +K2 − g
N1 +N2 − g
]V } = E1∪2, (24)
which implies E1∪2 > (N1 +N2)H−1{[(K1 +K2)− (
K1−1P
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1P
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 )]V } > E1 +E2.
Step 4: E >
MX
i=1
Ei.
Consider another contest C3 = C(N3,K3, V ). Combine C1∪2 with C3. Then by the
result of Step 3, we must have E1∪2∪3 > E1∪2 + E3. In other words, the combined contest
C1∪2∪3 generates higher eﬀorts than the two separate contests C1∪2 and C3. Following this
argument, we have E >
MX
i=1
Ei, ∀M ≥ 2.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 establishes a mild suﬃcient condition (regular contest technology) for the
dominance of the grand contest: A grand contest always generates strictly more eﬀorts then
the split “smaller” subcontests, no matter how the pool of contestants are divided or how
the prizes are allocated across subcontests. Alternatively, merging “smaller” contests always
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creates more competition and induces contestants to exert more eﬀorts, no matter how these
“smaller” contests are constructed. But nevertheless, the regularity condition, i.e. the
weak concavity of H(e), is by no means a strong restriction. It is satisfied by the class of
power functions f(e) = eα, which have been commonly assumed as the contest technology
in the literature. Hence, the result of Theorem 2 holds for a wide class of contest settings.
Contestants in diﬀerent subcontests may respond diﬀerently after the grand contest is
split. Some of them may have to exert more eﬀorts, while others exert less, depending on the
particular structures of the subcontests. However, the “gain” of eﬀorts in some subcontests
always comes at the cost of “loss” in the others, and the “gain” must be more than oﬀset by
the “loss”. As a consequence, the total eﬀorts unambiguously decreases as the grand contest
is split.
Theorem 2 directly implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The grand contest generates a higher rent-dissipation rate than the set of split
contests.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we show that, compared to any split contests, the grand contest maximizes
the total eﬀorts induced. Thus, if the eﬀorts exerted by contestants accrue to the benefits
of the contest organizer, then a grand contest of a greater size better serves the interest of
the contest organizer. Besides the theoretical contribution, our results shed light on many
real-life situations that resemble the competition as we modeled in this paper.
Firstly, our results directly apply to the “Percentage Plan” admission policy undertaken
by the states of Texas, California and Florida. The “Percentage Plan” guarantees admissions
to a fixed portion of top students from each high school in the state. This policy has been
generally regarded as the natural alternative to aﬃrmative action to maintain ethnic diversity
in the state universities’ student body. However, this policy has been controversial ever since
its very inception. Despite of the high profile of the debate, claims have long been centered
on the eﬀectiveness of this policy as a means to achieve diversity, but nevertheless, its
ramifications on the eﬃciency of the education system has yet to be investigated. Our model
13
brings forth the possibility to assess the “Percentage Plan” on the ground of academic quality.
How does the admission scheme aﬀect high school students’ incentive to exert academic
eﬀorts? Our results predict that “downsizing” the admission competitions among students
from the state level to school level weakens students’ incentives to engage in academic eﬀorts.
High school students tend to be less willing to invest in academic eﬀorts. As a result,
the prediction may raise additional concerns to the policy makers, because the potential
benefits of the policy may come at the cost of the schooling systems’ educational output.
A comprehensive and fair assessment of the policy would be diﬃcult. Yet our results may
provide a novel view towards the “Percentage Plan”: its incentive eﬀect!
Secondly, our finding is also relevant to the organization of internal labor market inside a
firm. Team production has become an increasingly popular mechanism in organizing working
force. However, promotion-based compensation schemes are universally adopted to motivate
workers, while the evaluation of workers relies on their comparative performance, which re-
sembles a contest or a tournament. Thus, when workers are organized into a number of
teams, how should the firm pick out and reward top-performing workers? In particular, the
firm may distribute a number of “prizes” (higher-level positions, bonus, or other compensa-
tion packages) among these teams, thus top-performing workers within each team receive the
awards; by contrast, the firm may ignore workers’ ranks within their own teams, but allocate
the prizes based on the performance comparison across the entire working force. Our re-
sults suggest that workers’ intra-team rankings should be assigned lesser weights. Of course,
teams may perform diﬀerent tasks, and therefore the management may lack a universally
acceptable criterion to evaluate workers from diﬀerent teams. However, if the outputs of dif-
ferent teams can be compared on a common ground, the comparative performance should be
evaluated beyond each individual team, in order to provide a stronger incentive for workers
to exert productive eﬀorts.
Thirdly, our papers are closely related to the studies by Amegashie (2000), andMoldovanu
and Sela (2006). Amegashie (2000) compares two ways of “shortlisting” in two-stage imperfectly-
discriminatory contests. To selectK finalists from a pool of N contestants in the preliminary
stage, one shorting-listing procedure is to run a grand contest, in which each of the N con-
testants compete against all others. The other procedure is to evenly divide the pool of
contestants into K groups. In each group one winner survives to the final. Amegashie
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(2000) shows the former dominates the latter and induces more eﬀorts if contestants have
linear contest technology. We confirm his important insight and extend this thread of think-
ing in a context that allows for general contest technology and flexible division of the grand
contest. In a perfectly-discriminatory contest setting, Moldovanu and Sela (2006) show that
evenly spliting a grand contest into parallel subcontests do not benefit the contest organizer
if his/her payoﬀ is given by the total expected eﬀort outlays.
By the way of contrast, when a grand contest is split into a set of subcontests, in each
of which a subset of contestants compete for a subset of prizes, the total eﬀorts decrease.
Hence, to the extent that the rent-seeking activity is considered to be wasteful and undesir-
able, our results suggest that the contest organizer can successfully reduce the waste of loud
lobbying by dividing the grand contest into a set of subcontests of lower scales. Hence, our
results provide a rationale for “quota” systems, which are widely practiced when government
agencies allocate public resources. When public resources are distributed among diﬀerent
regions or groups in fixed quota, the rent-seeking activities are therefore downgraded to a
set of “intra-region” or “intra-group” competition. Thus, our paper is also related to Wärn-
eryd (1998), and Inderst, Müller, and Wärneryd (2005). Both of these papers suggest that
distributional conflicts can be reduced, if the jurisdictional organizations are more hierarchal.
In the practice of “quota” system, the prizes are often distributed among regions or
groups with the number of prizes in proportion to the populations of the regions or the
sizes of the groups. For instance, University of Texas system guarantees admissions to
students among the top four percent of each high school in the State of Texas. Such rules of
“proportional representations” mainly address the equity issue in allocation. However, our
results raise additional concerns regarding the implementation of a “quota” system: Does
the rule of “proportional representation” (assigning prizes proportional to the size of the
groups) guarantee fair re-distribution? We show by Theorem 1 that the larger the size of the
group, the more demanding the contest, and the more eﬀorts contestants in that group have
to expend in order to win the prizes. Consequently, those who are in a larger group receive
less surplus than those who are in a smaller group, although in the symmetric equilibria,
their expected gross payoﬀs are not diﬀerent from the contestants in smaller groups.
As a result, our results confirm the conventional wisdom that “the first in village is better
than the second in Rome” from an alternative angle. Theorem 1 implies that being among
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the top ten of a hundred requires a contestant of more eﬀorts than being the unique winner
of ten. The success among the mass usually rewards more than the success among a few,
and yet it as well demands more sacrifices. Thus, one may prefer to stay in “village”, instead
of going to “Rome” to struggle for a rise, in spite of the abundant opportunities for success
in “Rome”.
Finally, our paper leaves tremendous room for future extensions. A major caveat of our
paper is that we assume all contestants are identical. One challenging extension would be
to allow contestants to diﬀer in ability.
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Appendix: The proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, we assume K1N1 ≥
K2
N2
. The case K1N1 = 1 is trivial. If
K1
N1
= 1,
then
K1−1X
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 = K1 >
K1−1X
g1=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g . The rest of the sequence {
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g }K1+K2−1g=0 starts
from the term K2N2 . This leads to
K1+K2−1X
g1=K1
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g =
K2−1X
g1=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 . Therefore, we obtain
K1−1X
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1X
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 >
K1+K2−1X
g=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g . Next we focus on the case
K2
N2
≤ K1N1 < 1, which
leads to that 1 ≤ K2 < N2 and 1 < K1 < N1.
For any 1 ≤ L1 < M1, 1 ≤ L2 < M2 and integer t ≥ 0, we have the following properties.
Property 1: L1M1 S
L1+L2
M1+M2
S L2M2 if and only if
L1
M1
S L2M2 ; equivalently,
L1−t
M1−t S
L1+L2−t
M1+M2−t S
L2
M2
if and only if L1−tM1−t S
L2
M2
, where L1 − t ≥ 1.
Property 2: L1−tM1−t strictly decreases with t; while
L2−t
M2−t and
L1+L2−t
M1+M2−t strictly decrease
with t.
Property 3: Assume L1 − t ≥ 1. If L1−tM1−t ≤
L1+L2−t
M1+M2−t , then
L1−(t+1)
M1−(t+1) <
L1+L2−(t+1)
M1+M2−(t+1) ;
equivalently, if L1−(t+1)M1−(t+1) ≥
L1+L2−(t+1)
M1+M2−(t+1) , then
L1−t
M1−t >
L1+L2−t
M1+M2−t .
Our proof proceeds as follows.
Step 1: Because K1N1 ≥
K2
N2
, by Property 1, K1N1 ≥
K1+K2
N1+N2
. We define t1 = maxt∈{0,1,...,K1}{t|K1−tN1−t ≥
K2
N2
}, where K1−tN1−t decreases with t from Property 2. Note that t1 is well defined as when t = 0,
K1−t
N1−t ≥
K2
N2
, and when t = K1, K1−tN1−t <
K2
N2
. Thus we have t1 ∈ {0, 1, ..., K1−1}. from Property
1, we have K1−tN1−t ≥
K1+K2−t
N1+N2−t for t ∈ [0, t1]. Thus
t1X
h=0
K1 +K2 − h
N1 +N2 − h
≤
t1X
h=0
K1 − h
N1 − h
. (25)
We separate two cases: t1 = K1 − 1 and 0 ≤ t1 < K1 − 1.
Case 1: t1 = K1−1. In this case, the sequence {K1−g1N1−g1 }K1−1g1=0 is exhausted.
t1X
h=0
K1+K2−h
N1+N2−h ≤
t1X
h=0
K1−h
N1−h is equivalent to
K1−1X
g=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g ≤
K1−1X
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 .
The rest of the sequence {K1+K2−gN1+N2−g }K1+K2−1g=0 starts from the term K1+K2−t1−1N1+N2−t1−1 = K2N1+N2−K1 .
Clearly K2−hN2−h >
K2−h
N1+N2−K1−h , ∀h ∈ [0, K2 − 1] as N1 > K1.
Hence, we obtain
K1−1P
g1=0
K1−g1
N1−g1 +
K2−1P
g2=0
K2−g2
N2−g2 >
K1+K2−1P
g=0
K1+K2−g
N1+N2−g , which completes the proof.
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Case 2: 0 ≤ t1 < K1 − 1. In this case, by the definition of t1, we have K1−t1N1−t1 ≥
K2
N2
and
K1−t1−1
N1−t1−1 <
K2
N2
. Thus, by Property 1, we have K2N2 >
K1+K2−(t1+1)
N1+N2−(t1+1) >
K1−t1−1
N1−t1−1 .
Then we define t2 = maxt∈{0,1,...,K2}{t|K2−tN2−t ≥
K1−(t1+1)
N1−(t1+1)}. Note that t2 is well defined and
t2 ∈ [0,K2 − 1]. Thus, we obtain
t2X
h=0
K1+K2−(t1+1)−h
N1+N2−(t1+1)−h <
t2X
g=0
K2−g
N2−g , which implies
t1+t2+1X
g=0
K1 +K2 − g
N1 +N2 − g
<
t1X
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
+
t2X
g2=0
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
. (26)
The rest of sequence {K1+K2−gN1+N2−g }K1+K2−1g=0 starts from the term
K1+K2−(t1+1)−(t2+1)
N1+N2−(t1+1)−(t2+1) . Again,
we consider two possibilities.
Case 2.1: t2 = K2− 1. In this case, the sequence {K2−g2N2−g2 }K2−1g2=0 is exhausted. The rest of
sequence {K1+K2−gN1+N2−g }
K1+K2−1
g=0 starts from the term
K1−(t1+1)
N1+N2−K2−(t1+1) , while the rest of sequence
{K1−gN1−g}
K1−1
g=0 starts from the term
K1−(t1+1)
N1−(t1+1) . Clearly,
K1−(t1+1)−h
N1−(t1+1)−h >
K1−(t1+1)−h
N1+N2−K2−(t1+1)−h for all
h ∈ [0,K1 − t1 − 2] as N2 > K2. Hence we have
K1−t1−2X
h=0
K1 − (t1 + 1)− h
N1 − (t1 + 1)− h
>
K1−t1−2X
h=0
K1 − (t1 + 1)− h
N1 +N2 −K2 − (t1 + 1)− h
, (27)
which implies
K1−1X
g1=t1+1
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
>
K1+K2−1X
g=t1+K2+1
K1 +K2 − g
N1 +N2 − g
. (28)
Combine inequalities (25), (26) and (28), we have
K1−1X
g1=0
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
+
K2−1X
g2=0
K2 − g1
N2 − g1
>
K1+K2−1X
g=0
K1 +K2 − g
N1 +N2 − g
, (29)
which completes our proof.
Case 2.2: t2 < K2 − 1. We go to Step 2.
Step 2: In the Case 2.2, we have 0 ≤ t2 < K2 − 1 and 0 ≤ t1 < K1 − 1. From (26),
In order to show Lemma 1, we only need to show
K1+K2−1X
g=t1+t2+2
K1 +K2 − g
N1 +N2 − g
<
K1−1X
g1=t1+1
K1 − g1
N1 − g1
+
K2−1X
g2=t2+1
K2 − g2
N2 − g2
. (30)
Equivalently,
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[K1−(t1+1)]+[K2−(t2+1)]−1X
g=0
{[K1 − (t1 + 1)] + [K2 − (t2 + 1)]}− g
{[N1 − (t1 + 1)] + [N2 − (t2 + 1)]}− g
<
[K1−(t1+1)]−1X
g1=0
[K1 − (t1 + 1)]− g1
[N1 − (t1 + 1)]− g1
+
[K2−(t2+1)]−1X
g2=0
[K2 − (t2 + 1)]− g2
[N2 − (t2 + 1)]− g2
. (31)
Note that there are at most K1 − 2 and K2 − 2 terms in the two sequences on the right
hand side, since t1 > 0 and t2 > 0. By definition of t2, we have K2−t2N2−t2 ≥
K1−(t1+1)
N1−(t1+1) and
K2−(t2+1)
N2−(t2+1) <
K1−(t1+1)
N1−(t1+1) . In other words, the first term in the first sequence on the right hand
side of (31) is greater than the counterpart of the second sequence. The procedure in Step
1 can thus be applied again to the two sequences on the right hand side of (31).
We repeat the procedures in Steps 1 and 2 until we reach the end of sequence {K1−g1N1−g1 }K1−1g1=0
or {K2−g2N2−g2 }
K2−1
g2=0 . Then we can apply the reasoning in Case 2.1 of Step 1 to complete the
proof.
Q.E.D.
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